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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L. CRAIG KNUDSON, a/k/a 




UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 










Case No. 18162 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a decision of the Third Judicial 
District Court that affirmed an administrative action which had 
ostensibly adjudicated Appellant's so-called "support debt" and 
attendant obligation to reim~urse the Utah State Department of 
Social Services for payments made by the Department to Appellant's 
former wife (Co-Respondent) as support for the parties' child. 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Since the Appellant in the present proceeding was designated 
as "Defendant" in the administrative proceedings and since the 
Respondents herein were designated "Plaintiffs" in .that hearing, this 
Brief will endeavor to avoid confusion by designating the parties 
as follows: Appellant shall be referred to as "Craig", "Craig 
Knudson" or "Appellant." Respondent, Utah State Department of 
Social Services, shall be referred to as the "Department", 
"Department of Social Services" or "Respondent." Respondent, 
_,_ 
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Goldie Knudson, shall be referred to as "Goldie'', "Goldie 
Knudson" or "Co-Respondent." 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Craig and Goldie Knudson were married in Ogden, Utah on 
June 24, 1972 (R.38, 69). After their marriage, Craig worked 
as a salesman for various companies, largely handling promotions, 
liquidations and distress sales. Goldie was occasionally employed 
to work for these assorted companies on a temporary basis with 
Craig (R.45). Craig earned most of the family's regular income. 
Goldie's employment was episodic in nature and the earnings 
derived therefrom varied greatly (R.45). 
The couple purchased a Fleetwood mobile home in November 
or December of 1975 (R.44, 67, 70), paying approximately $2,000 
as a down payment (R.44). Title to the mobile home was taken 
in Craig's name alone (R.53). The balance of the purchase 
price was financed by the W.E.A. Credit Union (R.67, 70). 
After moving into the mobile home, Goldie ceased to work altogether 
(R.45), and Craig made all of the installment payments thereon 
(R.46 to 49). 
A son was born to the Knudsons on July 8, 1977 (R.38). 
Shortly thereafter, Craig obtained regular full-time employment 
as a salesman at LaBelle's Catalog Showroom store in Ogden, Utah 
(R.43). In January of 1978 Craig was given a promotion by 
LaBelle's and advanced to the position of sales manager for 
the audio department at LaBelle's new store to be opened in 
Provo, Utah (R.43). The Knudsons prepared to move to Provo 
-2-
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in order that Craig might assume his new job in March of 1978 
(R.43, 44). In this connection, Goldie advertised the mobile 
home in Ogden for rent in the Ogden Standard Examiner (R.44, 52, 
78). The mobile home was rented for $225.00 per month (R.44, 
52, 59), and Goldie accepted a security deposit from the pro-
spective tenants (R.44, 59). With the assistance of a U-Haul 
trailer provided by LaBelle's, the Knudsons moved to Provo in 
late February or early March of 1978 (R.44). 
Craig obtained a suitable residence for his family in 
Provo (R.44), and assumed his duties as audio manager at the 
new store. In order to prepare for the "grand opening," Craig 
was required to work evenings, as well as days. Goldie became 
dissatisfied that Craig was not spending enough time with her 
(R.44). Consequently, one evening in March or early April of 
1978, when Craig had returned from the store for a meal, Goldie 
demanded that Craig spend more time with her and, in particular, 
remain home that evening (R.44). Craig told her that he was 
required to return to work, whereupon she threatened to leave 
(R.44). In fact, Goldie left Craig that night and, with their 
son, took up residence once again in the mobile home in Ogden 
(R.44, 46). The tenants had not then entered into occupancy 
of the trailer; they were subsequently denied occupancy by 
Goldie, who continues to reside in the trailer. 
Shortly after she left Craig, Goldie began demanding that 
Craig pay her $200 per month as child support (R.45, 46). 
Craig and Goldie had a number of conversations concerning her 
-3-
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demands for child support during April and May of 1978 (R.45, 
46). They reached an oral agreement that Craig would permit 
Goldie to occupy the mobile home in Ogden rent-free in lieu of 
cash support payments to her (R.46). As part of this arrange-
ment, Craig was to continue to make the installment payments to 
the credit union, to pay the lot rent for the trailer space 
and otherwise to defer the expenses connected with the mobile 
home (R.46). At this time, Goldie had not filed for divorce 
or otherwise sought support and maintenance from Craig in any 
judicial proceeding. Craig hoped to effect a reconciliation. 
Sometime during the Summer of 1978, Goldie informed Craig 
that she was seeking public assistance and that the welfare 
department would seek reimbursement from him (R.45). Subsequently, 
Craig did receive a letter and two telephone calls from the 
Department of Social Services with respect to such reimbursement 
(R.46). The first telephone call was received by Craig at the 
LaBelle's store in Provo (R.46) sometime during October of 1978. 
The caller was a gentleman who identified himself as an agent 
of the Department of Social Services, and inquired whether or 
not Craig was making support payments to his wife (R.46). 
Craig explained the substance of his agreement with Goldie and 
pointed out the fact that he was making the installment payment 
on the trailer which she occupied, the lot payment on the trailer 
space, the taxes on the trailer and the like (R.46). Shortly 
thereafter, Craig received another inquiry by telephone from 
a Departmental agent. This time the caller was a woman (R.46). 
Craig explained to her the same things which he had previously 
-4-
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described to the gentleman (R.47). Upon the basis of these 
conversations, Craig understood that these payments-in-kind 
were satisfactory to the Department. He was not aware of any 
claim by either Goldie or the Department to the contrary until 
this proceeding was commenced almost eighteen months later (R.46, 
47' 59' 60). 
A month or more after these telephone conversations, Goldie 
filed a divorce action against Craig on or about December 5, 
1978, in the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County 
(Knudson v. Knudson, Civil No. 71529). Notwithstanding the 
provisions of Sections 78-45-7(3), 78-45-9, and 78-45b-3, the 
Department of Social Services did not enter an appearance or 
otherwise participate in the divorce action (R.66 to 74). 
Early in the course of the divorce action, Goldie sought 
temporary alimony and child support from Craig by a Motion for 
Order to Show Cause, filed on or about February 26, 1979. In 
connection therewith, Goldie filed an Affidavit (R.76 to 77) 
in which she recited the "amounts ... reasonably necessary to 
maintain (her) and her child." As necessary expenditures for 
support, Goldie's Affidavit begins by listing $173 per month 
as the payment obligation on the mobile home, $8 per month as 
insurance thereon, $60 per month as lot rent for the space 
occupied by the trailer, and $15 per month as taxes assessed 
against the trailer (R.75). The cumulative amount of these 
expenses is $256 per month. At the time, Craig was, in fact, 
paying all of these expenses (R.47 to 49, 79 to 83). Goldie 
-5-
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also sought an additional $445 per month in her Affidavit (R.76), 
So far as the record discloses, no order of temporary 
alimony or support was ever entered in the divorce action (R.39), 
apparently because Craig was paying the expenses associated with 
the housing of Goldie and the child. The divorce proceeding 
came on for an evidentiary hearing on August 23, 1979, but a 
Decree was not entered and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were not made until November 21, 1979 (R.66 to 74). 
The Decree (R.66 to 68) makes no mention of temporary 
alimony or support whatsoever. Goldie was awarded only $1 per 
year as prospective alimony and maintenance (R.67, Para. 5). 
Goldie was also awarded child support in the amount of $150 per 
month (R.67, Para. 4). However, Goldie was also ordered to 
assume and pay the installment obligation on the mobile home 
from and after September 1, 1979 (R.67, 68, Paras. 6 and 11). 
The Court awarded each party one-half of the equity in the mobile 
home as of Septebmer 1, 1979 (R.67). Since the entry of the 
Decree, Craig has complied with all provisions thereof. 
The administrative proceeding to collect support payments 
was commenced on or about January 16, 1980, to recover for pay-
ments made by the Department to Goldie during the pendency of 
the divorce action, but prior to the hearing thereon and prior 
to the entry of the Decree therein. The divorce action was 
filed on or about December 5, 1978, and the hearing thereon 
occurred on August 23, 1979. Thus, the Department seeks re-
imbursement for support payments in the amount of $176 per month 
-6-
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from December of 1978 through July of 1979. During this period, 
the Department provided benefits, for which it now seeks re-
imbursement from Craig, in the cumulative amount of $1,408.00. 
During the same period, Craig provided benefits to Goldie at the 
rate of $256 per month, for a cumulative total, over the same 
period, of approximately ~2,048.00. But since Craig provided 
these benefits to Goldie in-kind, rather than in-cash, the 
Department takes the position that Craig provided no support 
to Goldie and, hence, should reimburse the State for its payments 
on precisely the same basis as if Craig has provided no benefits 
whatsoever to his family. 
The administrative proceeding came on for hearing before 
the Honorable Carolyn N. Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, on 
February 26, 1980. The only witness to testify was Appellant, 
Craig Knudson. Although Goldie was present at the hearing and 
occasionally interjected unsolicited comments, she was not called 
as a witness by the Department. Indeed, the Department adduced 
no evidence whatsoever, aside from its records concerning the 
amount of money the Department had paid to Goldie over the period 
in question (R.39, 62 to 65). The Department did not interpose 
any evidentiary objections to the testimony adduced by Appellant . 
at the administrative hearing. Consequently, the facts as 
stated herein stand uncontroverted and undisputed. 
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS 
The foregoing uncontroverted testimony clearly demonstrates 
the following essential propositions: 
-7-
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1. Goldie refused to reside·with her husband at his place 
of employment and abandoned him to return to his mobile home 
in Ogden. 
2. Thereafter, Goldie demanded that Craig pay her $200 
per month as support for her and for their son. After some dis-
cussions, Goldie agreed to accept rent-free occupation of the 
trailer, together with certain associated benefits, in lieu of 
such cash payments. 
3. The reasonable rental value of the trailer occupied 
by Goldie and the child under this arrangement, as demonstrated 
by the actual rental thereof prior to the parties' move to Provo, 
exceeded $225 per month. 
4. The cost to Craig of providing such rent-free housing 
for Goldie and the child amounted to approximately $256 per month. 
5. The Department of Social Services received actual notice 
of the facts (i) that Craig was providing housing to Goldie and 
the child on a gratis basis, (ii) that the provision of such 
housing required a monthly expenditure somewhat in excess of the 
support requested by Goldie for herself and for the child, (iii) 
that Goldie had agreed to accept such rent-free housing in lieu 
of cash payments of support, and (iv) that Craig was relying upon 
a reasonable belief as to the efficacy of such an arrangement. 
6. The Department never entered an appearance in the 
divorce action and never advised Craig that the continued pro-
vision of rent-free housing was unsatisfactory or less satisfactory 
than payments in cash. 
-8-
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7. Goldie continued to accept rent-free housing from 
Craig under the parties' previous arrangement even after the 
commencement of the divorce action and after the receipt of wel-
fare benefits from the Department. Although Goldie moved for an 
order granting her temporary alimony and child support, no such 
order was ever entered in the divorce action, once it became 
clear that Craig was already providing benefits to Goldie in an 
amount equal to or in excess of the amount of any temporary 
support to which she might conceivably be entitled under the 
circumstances. 
8. Under the Decree of Divorce, Craig was relieved of 
any obligation to continue the provision of rent-free housing 
in the trailer for Goldie, an expense amounting to approximately 
$256 per month, and ordered instead to make cash payments of 
child support to her in the amount of $150 per month and alimony 
in the amount of $1 per year. The actual effect of the Decree 
was a net reduction in the cost to Craig of the benefits provided 
to _Goldie and the child of $105 per month. 
DISPOSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING 
On or about March 5, 1980, a Memorandum of Findings and 
Order was entered jointly by Carolyn N. Eklund, the Administrative 
Law Judge, before whom the case was tried, and by John P. Abbott, 
Director of the Office of Recovery Services, who had not been 
present at the proceedings and had not heard the evidence. The 
Memorandum and Order concludes: 
(1) That Appellant, Craig Knudson, is entitled to a 
-9-
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credit for the lot rental payments which he made to secure a 
space upon which to locate the trailer; but 
(2) That Appellant is entitled to a credit neither (i) 
for the reasonable rental value of the trailer itself (this is 
a necessary inference but is not an explicit conclusion), nor 
(ii) for the cost incurred by him in making the same available 
for exclusive use by Goldie andtheir child. In this connection, 
the Memorandum and Order somehow concludes that Appellant would 
be "unjustly enriched" by such a credit, because the Decree of 
,Divorce awarded Craig one-half of the equity in the trailer --
a trailer for which Craig had paid all or substantially all of 
the original consideration and all of the installment payments 
for the nearly four years since its purchase. 
The findings of fact included within the agency Memorandum 
and Order are generally accurate, but they reflect only a slight 
fraction of the undisputed facts adduced at the hearing. Said 
findings are inadequate either to support the agency decision 
or to support any alternative decision. However, the testimony 
adduced at trial was credible, consistent and uncontroverted. 
Additional findings based thereon should have been made, and 
additional facts should have been adduced by the Department. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding, upheld the Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge without comment concerning his 
ratio decedendi (R.173). No argument had been heard (R.169, 173). 
-10-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court and of that portion of the administrative 
Memorandum and Order which denies recognition to the reasonable 
rental value of the housing and other benefits provided by 
Appellant for his family during the period in question and 
which thereby adjudicates Appellant's putative "support debt'' 
in derogation of the facts and circumstances of the case. 
Appellant seeks a decision and Order from the Court determining 
that he has no obligation to make reimbursement to the Depart-
ment in this proceeding. Appellant further seeks an award of his 
attorneys' fees. ARGUMENT 
I . 
THE DEPARTMENT IS BARRED FROM 
RECOVERING REIMBURSEMENT FROM APPELLANT 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
Utah law is clear that estoppel by judgment, or res judicata, 
applies (i) not only to claims which were actually litigated but 
to claims which might have. been litigated in the prior proceeding, 
and (ii) not only to parties represented in the prior proceeding 
but also to persons or entities "in privity with or claiming 
through" a party appearing in the prior proceeding. In the 
recent case of Krofcheck vs. Downey State Bank, 580 P.2d 240 
(Utah, 1978) this Court reiterated these princiµles 
in holding that the bar of res judicata or estoppel by judgment 
applies when: 
( 1) the present case involves the same party or ''one in 
-11-
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privity with or claiming through a party appearing in the 
prior action;" 
(2) there has been a final judgment in the prior action; 
and 
(3) the issue in question was raised or "could have been 
raised" in the prior proceeding. 
Each of the Krofcheck criterion has been met in the instant 
case. First, the Department freely admits in the course of its 
argument (R.144) that it is in privity with a party to the prior 
proceeding which is relevant here, i.e., the divorce action betwee1 
Craig and Goldie. Indeed, it claims to have been the "real 
party in interest" in that prior action (R.144),and the Depart-
ment claims to have been in privity with Goldie by virtue of 
a written assignment of the very claims which were litigated 
by Goldie in the prior action (R.144). Moreover, the Department 
has no independent right of recovery against Craig, except by 
claiming through Goldie. This Court in Mecham vs. ~echam, 570 
P.2d 123, (Utah, 1977) clearly so held: 
"As to reimbursement for support furnished [by the 
Department] to Maxine Mecham, the department's rights 
are derivative from and no greater than Maxine's 
rights." 570 P.2d at 125. 
This principle was acknowledged and reaffirmed in the re-
cent decision of the Court in Roberts vs. Roberts, 592 P.2d 
597 (Utah, 1979). Hence, the Department was in privity with 
Goldie in the prior action for two separate reasons: First, 
the Department was in privity with Goldie as a matter of fact 
by virtue of a written contract, wherein Goldie assigned to the 
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Department the benefit of the very rights which she sued to 
enforce in the prior action. Second, the Department was in 
privity with Goldie as a matter of law, because the Department's 
rights are entirely derivative from Goldie's rights. That is 
to say, the Department can only recover against Craig by "claiming 
through Goldie." Consequently, the Departroont's argument that 
it was a real party in interest to the prior action by virtue 
of a written assignment from Goldie hardly serves as a defense 
against the application of res judicata to this case. Quite the 
contrary, such an argument admits and thereby proves that the 
Department stood in privity with a party in the prior action. As 
such, the Department's admission demonstrates beyond any question 
that the first standard of the Krofcheck test has been met. 
The second standard of the Krof check test has also been 
met: there can be no question that a final judgment in the 
prior divorce case has been entered. 
Similarly, the third standard of the Krofcheck test has 
been satisfied. The question of liability for child support 
payments not only "could have been litigated" but was actually 
litigated in the prior proceeding. In this connection, it 
should be observed that the bar of res judicata applies so long 
as the claim was raised or might have been raised, regardless 
of whether it was actually decided in the prior proceeding. 
See: Krofcheck, supra: and Belliston vs. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 
379 (Utah, 1974) wherein this Court held: 
" . this court [has] stated that the doctrine of 
res judicata applies not only to points and issues 
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which were actually raised and decided in a prior 
action, but also to those that could have been 
adjudicated ... " (521 P. 2d at 380). 
The question of temporary alimony and child support was 
actually raised in the prior proceeding. Since Craig was pro-
viding adequate support for his family, Goldie chose not to 
press her claim for temporary child support to judgment. However, 
a motion for temporary child support and alimony, together with a 
supporting affidavit and order to show cause are of record in 
the prior divorce proceeding; and the :affidavit is of record 
in the administrative proceeding from which this appeal is 
taken (R.75 to 77). 
Applying the principles of Krofcheck and Belliston to a 
case almost indistinguishable from the instant one, this Court 
held that the principle of res judicata precluded the Department 
of Social Services from seeking, after entry of a divorce decree 
which failed to mention the temporary alimony and child support 
that had been sought in that divorce proceeding, reimbursement for 
support payments made during the pendency of the prior divorce 
action. In this connection, the Court held as follows: 
" . . the same principle applies to child support 
which accumulated prior to the date of the [divorce] 
decree . . . Maxine had pleaded in her complaint for 
temporary child support; there was no provision in 
the decree for any sum expended for support of the 
child [during the pendency of the divorce action] . 
Maxine also had a duty to support the child, Section 
78-45-4. Under the decree she was ordered to assume 
and pay any and all debts she had incurred since the 
filing of the complaint and to hold her husband harm-
less. Maxine did not seek in the decree any sum for 
reimbursement for the money she had expended for 
support of the child, although she had put that matter 
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at issue in her pleadings. The rights of the Department 
are derived through Maxine the matter is res judicata." 
Mecham vs. Mecham, 570 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah, 1977) (empha-
sis added). 
In the face of these compelling authorities, the Department has 
contended that the Mecham decision was overruled by Roberts vs. 
Roberts (R.144). That is simply not true. This Court in Roberts 
reached a different result because the facts were different. Nothing 
in Roberts indicates that Mecham is overruled on its own facts. 
Indeed,.the court in Roberts reaffirmed Mecham's cogency under facts 
similar to those in evidence in the instant case by holding: 
''Mecham does not prevent the State from ever obtaining 
reimbursement for sums expended by the state prior to 
a court decree. Rather, it merely holds that the State's 
right to reimbursement is derivative from the person en-
titled to support and is limited to the amount of support 
fixed by the· court. Because the district court assessed 
no child support payments against the defendant until 
after the effective date of the decree, the State was not 
entitled to reimbursement for those sums expended upon 
the child before the decree." Roberts vs. Roberts, 529 
P.2d 597, 599 (Utah, 1979). 
That is, indeed, the holding in Mecham. And, more impor-
tantly, that remains clearly the law applicable to the facts of 
this case. The Court reached a different result in Roberts solely 
because the Department had timely intervened and asserted its claim 
in the Roberts' divorce action. Consequ~ntly, no claim of res 
judicata was possible under Roberts' facts. It would be clearly 
erroneous, however, to conclude, as the Department argues, that 
because the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable under 
Roberts' facts, the Roberts decision must somehow overrule Utah 
law on res judicata questions! 
Moreover, the Court in Roberts mentioned the 1977 amend-
ments to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, Utah 
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Code Ann. §§78-45-1 to 78-45-13 (1953), which may have been 
made, in part, as a legislative response to the Mecham decision. 
In particular, the legislature added subsection (2) to §78-45-9 
(Sess. L, 1977, Ch. 145, Sect. 11). This provision provides as 
follows: 
"(2) No obligee shall commence any action to recover 
support due or owing that obligee whether under this 
act or any other applicable statute without first 
filing an affidavit with the court stating whether 
that obligee has received public assistance from any 
source, and if the obligee has received public assis-
tance, that the obligee has notified the department of 
Social Services in writing of the pending action." 
This provision was obviously inserted to protect the State 
against the res judicata effects of decisions entered in divorce 
proceedings. It.should be observed, however, that the statute 
clearly acknowledges that res judicata effects will attend any 
final judgment entered in such divorce proceedings. Otherwise, 
there would be no need for such a statute. 
Conceivably, the legislature could have provided for a 
jurisdictional disability to proceed with divorce actions until 
and unless the Department had been duly informed. Alternately, 
the legislature could have provided that divorce decrees would 
not become final vis-a-vis the Department, until and unless 
the Department was made a party thereto. This, however, the 
legislature refused to do. Rather, the legislature sought to 
address this problem, not by changing the law with respect to 
res judicata and the finality of judicial decrees, but rather 
by requiring welfare recipients to notify the Department of 
the pendency of such judicial proceedings in order that the 
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Department might enter a timely appearance therein and thereby 
act to protect its claims and interests against the bar of 
res judicata which would otherwise apply. 
Certainly, there is nothing in either this statute or in 
the decisions of this Court which would even .. re-
notely suggest that the principles of res judicata have been 
somehow superseded or suspended as applied to the Department. 
Indeed, the raison de etre of the post-Mecham statutory amend-
ments was the accepted and understood application of the general 
principles of res judicata to cases of this nature. The Depart-
ment's argument that these authorities have somehow lifted the 
bar of res judicata as applied to the Department is simply and 
obviously a non sequitur. 
Moreover, additional support for the theory that the Depart-
ment is barred by the decree entered in the prior divorce 
action is provided by Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(5) (1953) -- a 
portion of the Public Support of Children Act: 
"(5) Any Court order embodying a money judgment for 
support to be paid to an obligee by any person -shall 
be deemed [to be] in favor of the department [of 
Social Services] to the extent of the amount of the 
department's subrogation rights. This transfer of 
interest shall be applicable to court orders including, 
but not limited to, temporary spouse support orders, 
family naintenance orders, or alimony orders for the 
benefit of a dependent child but allocated to the 
benefit of that child on the basis of providing 
necessities to the person in whose custody that 
dependent child resides." (emphasis added) 
The clear implication of this statute is that the Depart-
ment's rights are delimited by the court order entered in a prior 
divorce proceeding. The Department, by virtue of its "subrogation 
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rights" gets the benefit of the judgment in a prior divorce 
proceeding. However, the Department should also bear the burden 
of that adjudication as well. The estoppel arising from the 
entry of such a judgment must, in equity, be mutual. Certainly, 
there is nothing in the Public Support of Children Act which 
would even remotely suggest that the Department may claim the 
benefit of an estoppel arising from such a judicial decree but 
still avoid the "inconvenience" of being bound by its less 
favorable terms. To get the benefit, the Department must bear 
the burden. 
This already clear implication is bolstered by the next 
provision of the same statute, which declares: 
"(6) The Department shall have the right to petition 
the court for modification of any court order on the 
same basis as a party to that action would have been 
able to do so." §78-45b-3(6) (emphasis added). 
The application of generally accepted and universally known 
principles .or res judicata to the facts of this case is neither 
unexpected nor unfair, even assuming, arguendo, that the 
Department had a viable claim against the Appellant::;· The 
preclusion of that claim by the bar of res judicata is not the 
Appellant's fault. After all, the Appellant was merely a hapless 
defendant in the divorce proceeding. The Appellant was not in 
privity with and had no direct responsibilities or obligations 
to the Department. Quite the contrary, the Departnent's 
difficulties in this case were of its own making. They were 
the direct and proximate result of its own negligence in failing 
to supervise and police the actions of its welfare recipients. 
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Goldie, not Craig, had a duty to advise the Departnent of the 
pendency of the divorce action. The Department, not Craig, 
had the responsibility to monitor Goldie's compliance with this 
requirement. Indeed, Craig had no reliable way of knowing 
whether or not the Department had, in fact, any viable interest 
in the divorce action. Most assuredly, he was not a knowing 
participant in any scherre or artifice to defraud the Departroont. 
It made no difference to him whether the Department participated 
in the divorce action or not. In short, there is no conceivable 
rationale upon which the burden of the Department's own negligence 
or Goldie's either negligent or knowing om.issions should be placed 
on Craig's shoulders. 
The Department may have a claim against Goldie. But it 
has no claim against Craig.~ The Department knew or reasonably 
should have known that its rights would be precluded by any 
action brought by Goldie. That was the direct, clear and un-
avoidable meaning of the statutes under which the Department 
was operating. To the extent that Goldie deceived the Depart-
ment or, alternately, to the extent that the Department negligently 
failed to intervene in the divorce proceeding notwithstanding 
such notice, the Department has no claim against Craig and 
no basis upon which to argue for broad and sweeping changes in 
the hitherto well-accepted principles of res judicata otherwise 
applicable to this case. 
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II. 
VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANT'S STATUTORY AND 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY THE DEPARTMENT 
SHOULD, AT LEAST, CAUSE THIS CASE TO BE 
REMANDED FOR A FULL AND FAIR HEARING 
The Department, however, seems to suggest that it has some 
sort of separate, non-derivative right to reimbursement from 
Appellant which exists apart from and was not precluded by the 
adjudication of, Goldie's rights. In this connection, the 
Department argues: 
" ... in addition, subsequent legislation was passed 
that specifically provided for payments which Meacham 
[sic] precluded. These provisions are set forth in 
Utah Code Annotated [sic] 78-45-7(3)" (R.144). 
But this theory is bereft of any support whatsoever, either in 
the law of this State or in the record of this proceeding. 
The_statute cited by the Department to support their 
theory in fact provides as follows: 
"78-45-7 Determination of Amount of Support. 
(1) Prospective Support shall be equal to the amount 
granted by prior court order unless there has been a 
material change of circumstance on the part of the 
obligor or the obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material 
change in circumstances has occurred, the court _in 
determining the amount of prospective support shall 
consider all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) The standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) The relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) The ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) The ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) The need of the obligee; 
(f) The age of the parties; 
(g) The responsibility of the obligor for support 
of others. 
(3) When no prior court order exists, the court shall 
determine and assess all arrearages based upon, but not 
limited to: 
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(a) The amount of public assistance received by 
the obligee, if any; 
(b) The funds that have been reasonably and 
necessarily expended in the support of spouse and 
children (emphasis added). 
This statute is part of the Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act, Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-1 to 78-45-13 (1953). As 
such, it deals exclusively with judicial determinations of the 
amount of support to be provided to an "obligee. '' On its face, 
the statute,has no application to the facts of the instant case 
because there was a prior court order entered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. The issue of "arrearages" or temporary 
support and alimony was raised in the prior judicial proceedings. 
The court order entered therein adjudicated this matter for the 
reasons amply indicated above. 
Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the provisions of 
Section 78-45-7 apply to administrative agency proceedings, 
rather than to judicial proceedings, and that the doctrine of 
res judicata is inapplicable, the Department still has not 
complied with the terms of this statute. In determining the 
amount of prospective support and of any "arrearages" owing 
under a support obligation, the statute, when read as a whole, 
clearly requires the court to consider "all relevant factors 
including but not limited to" the standard of living of the 
parties; the situation of the parties; the relative wealth and in-
come of the parties; the ability of the obliger to earn; the ability 
of the obligee to earn; the need of the obligee; the age of the 
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parties; the responsibility of the obligor for the support of 
others; and, to determine "arrearages", "when no prior court 
order exists," the amount of public assistance received by the 
obligee, if any. 
In its administrative hearing, the Department provided no 
evidence whatsoever bearing upon the standard of living and 
situation of the parties, the relative wealth and income of the 
parties, the ability of the obligor to earn a living, the ability 
of the obligee to earn a living, the need of the obligee, the age 
of the parties, or the possible responsibility of the obliger 
for the support of others. Indeed, the Department rested its 
case after showing only the amount of the support payments made 
to Goldie during the period in question. No effort was made 
to assess all or even to consider most of the other factors 
required for a proper determination of the "support obligation" 
of Appellant under the statute. Clearly, the Department had the 
burden of proof on this issue. The minimal facts that were 
presented relative to these considerations were produced by 
Appellant. This modicum of evidence consisted of Appellant's 
testimony that during the period for which the Department seeks 
reimbursement, Appellant was employed by LaBelle's as an audio 
manager (R.43); that from 1973 through 1975, inclusive, Goldie 
earned approximately $6,000 per year (R.45); that from 1975 
through 1978 Goldie had no earnings (R.45); that after leaving 
Appellant, Goldie requested that Appellant pay $200 each month 
as child support (R.45); that Appellant had then declared he 
could not afford to pay such support (R.46); and that Goldie 
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I 
worked during 1979 as a CETA summer work program bookkeeper 
(R.51). Appellant also introduced a certified copy of the divorce 
decree (R. 66 - 68), the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in the divorce proceeding (R.69 - 74), and the affidavit Goldie 
had used in an attempt to get support during the pendency of the 
divorce proceeding (R.75 - 77). 
There is no provision in any Utah statute which makes the 
provision of public assistance the sole and exclusive determinant 
of an obliger's duty to make reimbursement to the Department. 
The Supreme Court in Mecham observed: 
" . . . the duty of support of the obliger is to the 
obligee. The State Department of Social Services has 
only the right to enforce the amount of support which . 
is due the obligee from the obliger. The department 
may not unilaterally determine that amount and then 
enforce a right to reimbursement by an action ... " 
570 P.2d at 125 (emphasis added). 
Certainly, this principle was not overruled by the statute 
in question (Section 78-45-7(3)), nor by the subsequent decision 
in Roberts. Rather, the Court in Roberts held: 
"However, the above amendment [Section 78-45-7(3)] would 
constitute a denial of due process to the obliger's 
spouse if the court assessed the obliger for all public 
assistance payments received by the obligee, without 
considering relevant factors such as the relative wealth 
and income of the parties; and the ability of the 
parties to earn income. Under [section] 78-45-7(2) 
seven such factors are required to be considered in 
determining the amount of prospective support. Under 
the Public Support of Children Act [78-45b-6(2)], 
which provides an administrative procedure for obtaining 
reimbursement for assistance payments made on behalf 
of minor children, similar factors must be considered 
in the hearing to determine the extent of the parent's 
liability for child support [footnote omitted]. The 
assessment of arrearages under [section] 78-45-7(3) 
must also be subject to consideration of the same 
factors." 592 P.2d at 599 (emphasis added). 
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It is, in fact, the Public Support of Children Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§78-45b-l to 78-45b-22 (1953), which gove~ns the type 
of administrative hearing held in the instant case. Section 
78-45b-4 provides the method for the Department to collect a 
support debt established by prior court order. Sections 78-45b-5 
and 78-45b-6 provide for an administrative hearing to establish 
the required support in the absence of a prior court order. But 
in the instant case the divorce decree determined sub silentio 
that no support debt was owed by Appellant. 
Even when such an administrative hearing is proper, Section 
78-45b-6(2) requires a "full and fair" hearing that considers 
factors similar to those mandated by Section 78-45-7(2). It must 
be clear beyond cavil, then, that the provision of prior public 
assistance to an obligee is not the talisman of "reimbursement" 
liability as against the obligee's husband or father. Rather, 
before any obligation to make reimbursement to the Department may 
be constitutionally determined, all of the relevant factors 
"including but not limited to" those set forth in Section 78-45-7(2) 
must be carefully considered. Few, if any, of those factors were 
considered in this case. The Department made no effort whatsoever 
to adduce any testimony or other evidence bearing upon such 
factors. Notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous language in 
Roberts to the contrary, the Department blithely and blindly 
argues that subsection (3) of Section 78-45-7 is somehow a 
self-effectuating mandate for reimbursement completely independent 
of the provisions of subsection (2) of the same statute. The 
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incredible thing about this daring argument is that the Department 
has the remarkable temerity to cite Roberts in support of this 
contention! 
It is equally intriguing that the Order of the Administrative 
Law Judge was assertedly based, at least partially, upon the prior 
decree of divorce that rendered such an administrative proceeding 
improper and upon the affidavit with which Goldie had unsuccessfully 
sought temporary support in the prior divorce proceeding (R.86). 
In view of the existence of the prior divorce decree which 
demonstrated Appellant had no support debt, the Department, as 
noted above, riould not have properly proceeded under Section 
78-45-7, 78-45b-4, or 78-45b-5. The Department should have sought 
a modification of the divorce decree in accordance with Section 
78-45b-3(6): 
"(6) The Department shall have the right to petition 
the court for modification of any court order on the 
same basis as a party to that action would have been 
able to do so." Section 78-45b-3(6) (emphasis added). 
But it is clear that Goldie, as party to the prior divorce 
proceeding, cannot now seek a retroactive modification of the 
divorce decree entered therein. That decree has become final. 
The time periods provided in Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure for the change or modification of said decree 
have long since expired. Certainly, Goldie could not now seek 
to re-open said decree and request a retrospective award of 
"temporary alimony and child support." If Goldie cannot properly 
seek such a retroactive modification of the prior decree, there 
is no reason in law or logic why the Department should be able 
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to do so. Indeed, this is precisely what the statute proscribes. 
Even were Section 78-45b-5 not rendered inapplicable by its 
own terms and the prior divorce decree, the Department should not 
be permitted to do indirectly under Section 78-45b-5 that which 
it cannot do directly under Section 78-45b-3. Yet this is precisely 
what the Department purported to do in this case. 
Consequently, the Department's mistaken argument that the 
primary issue before the Court on this appeal is whether or not 
the Department should be obligated to "consider" payments in-kind 
as support for a dependent child (R.144) simply begs the question. 
Before this issue may be properly addressed by the Court, the 
Department must first overcome two insurmountable obstacles: 
(1) The Department must somehow avoid the res judicata 
effects of the prior judicial decree entered in the divorce action 
which, under both Utah case law and the relevant Utah statutes, 
is dispositive of the issue which the Department seeks to raise 
anew under the guise of "reimbursement." 
(2) Having once avoided the application of res judicata, 
the Department must still establish that it has fully satisfied 
the requirements of Section 78-45-7(2) and Section 78-45b-6(2) 
which require it to plead and prove the material elements 
necessary to establish a proper support obligation, ''including, 
but not limited to," the standard of living of the parties, the 
sitaution of the parties, the relative wealth and income of the 
parties, the ability of the obligor to earn income, the ability 
of the obligee to earn income, the need of the obligee for 
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;j: 
financial support, the age of the parties, the responsibility of 
the obliger to support others, and similar factors which may be 
material to a proper and circumspect assessment of a support 
obligation. The Department has utterly failed to carry this 
burden of proof. The record is even devoid of any evidence 
arguably sufficient to permit f~ndings on these issues. 
III. 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE PRECLUDE 
THE DEPARTMENT FROM RECOVERING REIMBURSEMENT 
FROM APPELLANT 
It is only after the Department has somehow satisfied 
the foregoing burdens that any question as to the efficacy of 
payments-in-kind to satisfy a support obligation can be properly 
raised. 
The Department has argued that a "general rule" exists 
which declares "that the father is not entitled as a matter of 
law to credit for ... voluntary expenditures when they are 
made in a manner other than that specified by the support order 
or divorce decree'' (R.145). But the fact of paramount importance 
is that the instant case does not present a question of payments-in-
kind tendered to satisfy a liquidated judicial decree ordering 
payments-in-cash, much less the even more remote question of the 
efficacy of payments-in-kind to satisfy already accrued payments 
under such a decree. Moreover, even if this case presented a 
situation within the purview of that so-called "general rule", 
this Court has repeatedly recognized "equitable 
exceptions" to the "general rule" which would be applicable. 
-27-
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See, e.g., Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 42 P.2d 191 (Utah, 1935) (dictum) 
and Boggs vs. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah, 1974) (dictum). 
Considering the agreement between Appellant and Goldie that 
Goldie and her child could live in the trailer house, which was 
paid for by Appellant and the title for which was in the name of 
Appellant qnly (R.53), in lieu of Appellant's making cash payments 
for child support demanded by Goldie but not ordered by any court 
(R.46), the most compelling case is Ross vs. Ross, 592 P.2d 600, 
603-604 (Utah, 1979) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added): 
"Plaintiff is not entitled, however to credit for 
expenditures made on behalf of the children or 
defendant which do not specifically conform to the 
terms of the decree. To do so would permit plain-
tiff to vary the terms of the decree and to usurp 
from defendant the right to determine the manner 
in which the money should be spent. Only if the 
defendant has consented to the plaintiff's voluntary 
expenditures as an alternative manner of satisfying 
his alimony and child support obligation, can 
plaintiff receive credit for such expenditures." 
Obviously, the Appellant would not object should the Court 
decide to apply such an "equitable exception" as a rubric for 
reaching a correct result here. Indeed, the compelling cir-
cumstances of the present case certainly call for the application 
of such an "equitable exception," assuming that the "general 
rule" applies at all. But speculation over the scope and applica-
t ion of such ''equitable except ions" is unnecessary under the 
circumstances of this case, because this case does not fall 
withinthepurview of the ostensible "general rule" in any event. 
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requiring Appellant to pay any specific amount of support in cash 
or otherwise. Moreover, there was then -- and is now -- no legal 
requirement that a man, during coverture, support his wife and 
child by payments in cash. Prior to the entry of a judicial 
decree requiring liquidated support payments in cash, the question 
t of whether or not a husband and father is providing adequately is 
~ not and cannot be fairly and rationally analyzed in terms of 
"cash payments." Rather, the question of whether such an "ob~igor" 
is providing support must be determined by reference to whether 
or not he has provided his family with the reasonable necessities 
of life, including such items as housing, food, and clothing. 
Certainly, it cannot be meaningfully contended -- as the Depart-
ment incredibly, if intrepidly, argues by implication -- that a 
father is not supporting his family when he is providing them 
with the necessities of life unless such payments are in cash. 
Had Craig paid Goldie $225.00 per month in cash -- an amount 
established in an arm's length transaction as the rental value 
of the trailer house (R.44, 59) -- so that Goldie could have rented 
the same housing which she and her child occupied gratis at 
Appellant's expense of $256 per month (R.53, 75), then, apparently, 
~ the Department would have no complaint. However, because Appellant 
provided this benefit "in-kind", the Department considers it 
to be "administratively inconvenient" to acknowledge its existence 
(R.27,145). . Surely this is a distinction without a difference. 
Furthermore, either the benefits conferred ($225 per month) or 
the costs incurred ($256 per month) exceed the $176 per month 
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"support debt" alleged by the Department to exist. 
Still, the Department essentially argues that it is "too con-
fusing" and too much of a burden for the Department to consider 
anything other than cash payments: 
"The Department suggests that the general rule is 
sound because if you begin making exceptions there 
is [sic] no factual or legal criteria [sic] upon 
which to base such exceptions. At what point do 
benefits begin and end, how are the benefits 
determined, how much credit should be given, are 
just a few of the questions that come to mind 
if the petitioner's theories are followed. The 
benefit theory espoused could only lead to an 
administrative and legal nightmare. This is 
particularly true when the department is involved, 
rather than the parties to the marriage" (R.145). 
Once again, the Department appears to be arguing that 
its rights are somehow different from and superior to those of 
"the parties to the marriage." Since Utah law is clear that the 
Department's rights are entirely derived from Goldie's rights, 
this position is nonsense. However, the Department continues to 
argue: 
"As a practical matter the problems become insurmount-
able. What is the simple solution? Prohibit the "in 
lieu of" payments. This solution is certainly not an 
illogical and incomprehensible theory as suggested by 
petitioner, but represents a workable and sound basis 
for the resolution of the factual and legal problems 
which are inherent in the petitioner's proposed 
theories" (R.146). 
The Administrative Law Judge specifically denied Appellant 
any credit for the benefits he conferred or the costs he incurred 
in making the trailer house available to Goldie and her child because 
the divorce decree awarded Appellant one-half of the equity in the 
trailer house for which he alone had paid and the title to which 
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was solely in his name (R.86). Under ·the view most favorable to 
Appellant, he lost $225 rental income per month; spent $60 per 
month to rent a space for the trailer house; and made $196 in 
payments for the trailer and its protection, only half of the 
benefit of which did he receive. Thus, he "spent" $225 plus $60 
plus $98, or a total of $383, per month as "child support." Under 
the view most favorable to Respondents, which requires assuming 
that the lot rental of $60 was included in the trailer rental of 
$225 and that the divorce decree gave Goldie an equity in the 
trailer retroactive to the pendency of the divorce proceedings, 
the time for which the Department seeks reimbursement, Appellant 
"spent" 1/2($225 - $60) plus $60 plus $98, or a total of $240.50, 
per month as "child support." Such calculations do not seem overly 
burdensome; but even they are unnecessary because, as noted above, 
either the rental value of the trailer alone ($225 per month) 
or Appellant's out-of-pocket cost ($256 per month) for providing 
such housing exceeds the $176 per month demanded by the Department 
and the $150 per month established by the divorce decree as child 
support for the period after the time for which the Department 
seeks reimbursement. (It should again be remembered that despite 
Goldie's motion for temporary support during the pendency of the 
divorce action the divorce decree awarded no such temporary support.) 
' 
The Appellant would be strenuously taxed to find a more 
damning and compelling indictment of the unreasonable, unconsti-
tutional and grossly unfair position of the Department than that 
contained with the above quotations. The multiplication of 
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"administrative difficulties" is certainly no argument for the 
abridgment of substantial and, under the Roberts decision, con-
stitutional rights of the individual involved. The Department 
is all too quick to forget that it has the burden of proof, that 
it is bound as a governmental agency to observe the Constitution, 
and that its internal convenience is not the touchstone of the 
legal principles involved. Certainly, its proposed approach to 
making these factual determinat.ions -- which apparently consists 
of largely, if not exclusively, ignoring "inconvenient" facts -
casts considerable doubt· upon the limits which the Department 
sets upon itself in its own, in-house administrative proceedings 
to "adjudicate" its rights against individual citizens. Such 
a Departmental philosophy is hardly surprising, however, when 
one considers the latitude available for Departmental review 
of the Administrative Law Judge's findings: 
"78-45b-6.l. Findings and order by department 
Judicial review -- (1) Upon receipt of the administra-
tive hearing officer's report of findings on the issues 
designated for hearing, the department may accept the 
report of findings as the basis for a final order or 
upon filing a statement of the legal or substantial 
factual basis in the record therefor, it may: 
(a) Reject all or any portion of the findings 
and remand for further hearing and findings on 
specified issues; 
(b) Disregard any portion of the findings and 
proceed to enter a final order based upon the remainder 
of the findings; 
(c) Substitute alternative or additional findings 
of fact on the issues designated for hearing, if the 
substituted findings are supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence in the record. The department shall 
then cause its findings and order to be served upon 
the responsible parent." 
Indeed, counsel for the Department might extend his fatuous 
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arguments to an almost limitless extent. It is hardly conceivable 
that the "convenience" of the Department will be subserved by 
a simple distinction between "in-kind" and "in-cash" payments. 
Certainly the Department's arguments would apply with equal vigor 
to payments made, quite literally, "in-cash" for which no receipt 
was given and no cancelled check may be produced. Similarly, 
the Department might make precisely the same sort of argument 
with respect to payments made "in-cash" which, in the Department's 
curious and incomprehensible lexicon, somehow "benefited" the 
payer. For example, if an obligor makes a cash payment to an 
obligee, which the obligee then uses to make a house payment, 
which in turn might possibly result in the protection of the obligor's 
equity therein, will the Department be satisfied to credit the 
entire payment simply because it was "in-cash"? According to its 
argument, the Department cannot be discommoded by having to 
determine the relative "benefits" involved. Clearly the 
Department's "administrative convenience" might be impaired by 
examining these questions, which do not differ in any material 
respect from those which it finds intolerably inconvenient in 
the present case. 
In short, the Department does not propose a clear and com-
prehensible legal rule when it seeks to elevate its bureaucratic 
convenience into a self-effectuating fiat; it only creates an 
arbitrary and unfair rule which does justice to neither party. 
Obviously, little is gained by imagining "administrative 
difficulties" and multiplying the hypothetical ramifications of 
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these difficulties into some sort of "parade of horribles." The 
basic and ineluctable issue here is not the Department's convenience! 
but rather the Appellant's rights. The Department would do well 
to remember that the due process clauses of the Utah and Federal 
Constitutions were inserted therein to guarantee that individual 
citizens would be treated justly and fairly when they dealt with 
governmental agencies. This may be, and usually is, ''adminis-
tratively inconvenient;" but it is still the law, and the supreme 
law at that. 
The question here, as the Court observed in both Mecham 
and Roberts, is one of due process of law. The facts of this 
case graphically demonstrate the most execrable denial of due 
process to this Appellant. He has been forced to re-litigate 




of competent jurisdiction. By so doing, he has been forced to pay ·· 
for the Department's bureaucratic bungling and negligence in 
the administration of its own responsibilities. He has been .. 
~· 
coerced to appear before an administrative tribunal whose im-
partiality and constitutional efficacy are at best questionable. 
He has been victimized by a proceeding in which clear, comprehen-
sible, and uncontradicted evidence has been disregarded out-of-
hand. He has witnessed the Department utterly fail to meet the 
statutory standards and burden of proof applicable to the instant.case. 
He has seen a decision made and signed by an administrative 
officer who was not even present at the so-called "full and fair 
hearing." He has received a decision which ignores the facts 
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that were submitted into evidence. In sum, he has received an 
administrative decision which is founded primarily upon the 
"general rule" that the Department always wins, and which "is 
sound because if you begin making exceptions there is [sic] no 
factual or legal criteria [sic] upon which to base such exceptions" 
(R.145). On this appeal, he has been told in precisely that 
language that the administrative hearing process could offer him 
no relief, since it would be "inconvenient" to consider the 
actual facts of his case. This kind of protracted and egregious 
denial of due process should be redressed by this Court on this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the relevant Utah statutory and case law establish 
~ that the decree of divorce was res judicata upon Goldie's and 
P the Department's right to recover funds expended on behalf of· 
Appellant and Goldie's son during the pendency of the divorce 
proceedings. That decree demonstrated Appellant had no support 
obligation for the period in question beyond the support he had 
already provided. 
The Department, in seeking to obtain reimbursement from 
Appellant, utilized a path which was statutorily proscribed 
because of the existence of the prior divorce decree. Moreover, 
the Department even failed to consider the factors that due 
process as well as the applicable statutes and cases mandate 
when an administrative adjudication of a putative support debt 
is a proper course to pursue. And the Department has failed to 
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utilize in a timely fashion the appropriate means of redress-
judicial modification of the divorce decree. 
Finally, the undisputed facts of this case show beyond 
reasonable question that Appellant furnished support which more 
than satisfied even the Department's demand for $17~ per month 
during the pendency of the divorce proceeding. 
Therefore, the decisions of the Third Judicial District 
Court and the Administrative Law Judge should be reversed; this 
Court should declare that Appellant owes nothing to the Depart-
ment for child support during the pendency of the divorce action. 
If this is not done, the Court should, at least, remand the case 
so that the statutorily required factual determinations can be 
made. And, in view of the egregiously bad faith exhibited by the 
Department in pursuing Appellant, with full knowledge of the 
prior divorce decree, contrary to the clear dictates of due 
process, relevant statutes, and controlling case law, this Court 
should, in all equity and good conscience, award Appellant his 
attorneys' fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of February, 1982. 
JENSEN & LLOYD 
870 Commercial Security Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0457 
Telephone: (801) 322-2300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I have this 
day personally served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel of record for the Defendants 
and Respondents by hand-delivering the same to his offices in 
Ogden, Utah as follows: 
DATED this 25±h 
Robert D. Barclay 
Municipal Building, First Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
day of February, 1982. 
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